George Tsebelis (1989) shows that many analyses of crime and criminal behavior assume each actor chooses his strategy given fixed strategy choices for the police.I As Tsebelis points out, it is more accurate to assume the players make simultaneous strategy choices. He then presents a one-shot game in which two players-the police and the public-choose their strategies simultaneously. In this game, changes in the severity of punishments have no effect on the incidence of crime but do cause police to become more lax in their enforcement of law. Similarly, increased rewards for not violating the law (welfare measures) reduce the amount of law enforcement but not the crime rate.
I focus on a critical assumption in Tsebelis' analysis. While he discusses the relationship between police and public in terms of repeated interactions, his results and empirical implications are derived from a single-shot game. Tsebelis' model is therefore a simplification of the phenomena he is modeling. A citizen's decision to speed is not made only once; rather, it is a series of decisions made over time, whenever the citizen gets into a car. Similarly, a police officer must decide each day whether to enforce the law or not. Repeated interactions are also characteristic of the other relationships cited by Tsebelis: government regulators and regulated industries, leaders and subordinates in a hierarchy, and congressmen involved in an oversight relationship with an agency.
Results such as the Folk Theorem (Fudenberg and Maskin 1986; for similar results see Axelrod 1984) suggest it may be inappropriate to model iterated situations as one-shot games.3 In an iterated game, players can coordinate their strategies to produce mutually beneficial outcomes that are not equilibria in a oneshot version of the game. These agreements are sustained by the use of "trigger strategies" (Friedman 1971 ) whereby a player abides by the agreement as long as all other players do so. This behavior can be seen as the abstract equivalent of phenomena such as "trust," "norms," or "reputation." However, such phenomena cannot occur when players interact only once. Given the effect of iteration and the AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW VOLUME 84 NO. 2 JUNE 1990 fact that real-world interactions between the police and the public are repeated, it seems essential to generalize Tsebelis' oneshot results to the iterated case. The changes produced by iterating the police-public game are striking. In the one-shot game, the only equilibrium outcome is one where players use mixed strategies. However, in some iterated versions of the game, pure strategy outcomes can be sustained as subgame perfect equilibria (Selten 1975 ) if players do not discount future payoffs "too much" (to be made more precise later). In an iterated game analyzed here, the outcome where the public does not break the law and police do not enforce the law can be produced as an equilibrium if players use appropriate strategies. In this game, welfare measures make it easier to sustain this no-crime outcome, rather than having no effect, as in the one-shot game (Tsebelis 1989 , Theorem 4).
In sum, I agree with Tsebelis that decision theory should not be used to model game-theoretic situations. However I do not share his view that a one-shot game provides insight into the forces driving real-world crime and law enforcement. Table 1 gives the one-shot, two-player, police-public game presented in Tsebelis 1989 . In this game, the public chooses to speed or not to speed; the police choose to enforce the law or not (i.e., enforce or shirk). By construction, the public prefers to speed if the police shirk but not to speed if the police enforce the law. The police prefer to enforce if the public speeds but to shirk if the public does not speed. These assumptions are specified in terms of restrictions on the player's payoffs:
Public cl > a,, or 3 > 2 bi > di, or 7 > 5 Police a2>b2,or7>6 d2 > c2, or 7 > 4
Given these restrictions, Tsebelis shows (Theorem 1) that the only equilibrium outcome in this game is a mixed strategy outcome in which p* = (d-ca)/(a-.b2 + dZ-cam), (1) where p* is the probability that the public speeds; and q* = (bi
where q* is the probability that the police enforce. The probability that the public does not speed equals (1 -p*), while the probability that the police shirk equals
(1 -q*).4
Given the payoffs in Table 1 , the equilibrium mixed strategies are p* 5 .75 and q* = .66; that is, in equilibrium the public speeds with probability .75 and the police enforce the law with probability .66, yielding expected payoffs of 3.63 for the public and 6.25 for the police. Given this equilibrium, Tsebelis shows that increases in the penalty for being caught speeding (i.e., a decrease in aj) have no effect on the likelihood that the public chooses to speed (Theorem 2). The reason is that the increased penalty increases the likelihood that the police shirk (Theorem 3). Similarly, welfare measures (increases in cl or di) leave the crime rate unchanged but increase the likelihood of shirking by police (Theorems 4, 5).
Consider the effect of repeated play on police-public interactions. Suppose that the police and the public participate in an infinite series of one-shot games where the payoffs in each iteration t are given by Table 1 . Thus, in the first iteration (itera-570 tion 0) the public chooses to speed or not to speed while the police choose to enforce or to shirk. Players then incur payoffs based on their strategy choices. On the second iteration, the players again face the same choices and possible payoffs. The series of one-shot interactions and strategy choices continue infinitely.5 Each player's payoff for the entire game is the (discounted) sum of its payoffs in each iteration of the game. Payoffs in iteration t are discounted by wt. where 0 < w < 1. Finally, on any iteration t players know the history of the game-the strategy choices made by each player in all previous iterations.6 These assumptions are standard features of iterated games (see Friedman 1986 , chap. 3; Ordeshook 1986, chap. 3).
Tsebelis shows that if the police-public game is played once, the unique equilibrium mixed strategies are p* = .75 and q* = .66. However, the Folk Theorem suggests that if the game is iterated, other outcomes can be supported as equilibria. Consider the outcome where the public does not speed and the police shirk -the lower left-hand cell in Table 1 . Both players receive a higher payoff in this outcome than they do in the mixed strategy outcome. For the public, 5 > 3.63; for the police, 7 > 6.25. This outcome is not an equilibrium if the game is played once. If the police shirk, the public prefers to speed, thereby increasing its payoff from 5 to 7. But what if the game is iterated? As I will now show, if w (the discount rate) is "high enough," the players can choose strategies that yield the no-speed, noenforce outcome as a subgame perfect equilibrium. In other words, by coordinating their strategies, the players can make themselves better off.
Suppose the players use the following trigger strategies. Label the police strategy as e-trigger (e for enforce): e-trigger t -0: Shirk. t > 0: Shirk if the public has not sped in all previous iterations. Use the mixed strategy q* otherwise.
That is, the police begin the game by shirking and shirk on subsequent iterations if the public does not speed. However, if the public ever speeds, the police respond by reverting to the mixed strategy where they enforce the law on each iteration with probability .66.7 Label the public's strategy as n-trigger (n for not speed). That is, the public begins the game by not speeding and continues to do so as long as the police shirk. If the police ever switch to enforcing the law, the public responds by using the mixed strategy p* on all subsequent iterations. If the players use their trigger strategies, the no-speed, no-enforce outcome will be realized on each iteration of the game. These trigger strategies constitute a subgame perfect equilibrium if neither player prefers to switch from its trigger strategy to its maximin strategy (the strategy p* for the public and q * for the police), given that the other player responds by switching to its maximin strategy on subsequent iterations.
Consider first the public's incentive to switch. If both players use their trigger strategies, the public receives a payoff of 5 on each iteration, or a total payoff for the game of 5 + w1(5) + w2(5) + w3(5) + w * . 5/(1 -W).
If the public deviates from the agreement 571 with police and speeds on iteration 0 (or any iteration t) and plays its maximin strategy p* thereafter, the police will respond by reverting to their maximin strategy q* on the next iteration. In that case, the public receives a payoff of 7 initially and -3.63 on each iteration thereafter, or 7 + wl(3. After some algebra, this condition can be expressed in terms of a minimum value for w: w > .59. Turning to the police, they receive a payoff of 7 on each iteration where they shirk and the public does not speed, or a total payoff of 7/1(1 -w) if both players use their trigger strategies. If the police switch to enforcing the law and the public responds by reverting to p* subsequently, the police receive a payoff of 4 initially and 6.25 on subsequent iterations, or a total payoff of 4 + w(6.25)/ (1 -w). By inspection the police never have an incentive to deviate from an agreement to play trigger strategies: 7/(1 -w) > 4 + w(6.25)/(1 -w) for allw. Therefore, the no-crime, no-enforce outcome can be realized as a subgame perfect equilibrium in the iterated polices public game with payoffs if players use their trigger strategies and w 2 .59. In contrast, the only equilibrium to the oneshot game is one where players use mixed strategies. The difference between these results must be stressed. Analysis of the one-shot police-public game finds there is some probability in equilibrium that the public will speed and some probability that police will choose to enforce the law. However, in the iterated game examined here, if w > .59, the players are willing and able to coordinate their strategies to achieve an equilibrium outcome where the public does not speed and the police do not enforce the law.8
Adding iteration also modifies Tsebelis' conclusion about the effect of welfare measures. For example, suppose the public's reward for not speeding is increased: its payoff in the no-enforce, no-speed outcome is increased from 5 (as in Table  1 ) to 6. With this change, the player's equilibrium mixed strategies in the oneshot game are p* = .75 and q* = .5. If the players use these mixed strategies, the public receives a payoff of 4.5, while the police again receive a payoff of 6.25 on each iteration. However, if the players use trigger strategies to coordinate on the no-speed, no-enforce outcome, the public receives a payoff of 6/(1 -w). As a result, the public is better off coordinating with the police rather than deviating if 6/(1 -w) -7 + w(4.5)/(1 -w), or w 2 .4. Remember that without the welfare measures, the value of w needed to sustain the no-speed, no-enforce outcome is .59. Therefore, in the iterated policepublic game, welfare measures may reduce the crime rate by reducing the value of w needed to sustain an outcome where the public does not speed. In contrast, welfare measures have no effect on the equilibrium crime rate in the singleshot game (Tsebelis 1989 For example, consider this event: a firststring star quarterback is injured; but his replacement, after calling a few perfunctory running plays, proceeds to pass more frequently than the injured star. Such an event might seem paradoxical, but only if we assume that people maximize expected payoffs against opponents whose actions (defensive tactics) are invariant with changing circumstances (such as quarterback injuries). If we suppose that the opponent also adjusts to such change and that everyone takes everyone else's adjustments into account, game theory resolves the paradox. In our example, passing more frequently with a less profident player at the helm becomes understandable if we learn that the best response of the defense is to strengthen the line against the run so as to leave the offense with little option other than to pass.
Accommodating interdependent choice in two-person contexts, though, yields another apparent paradox that is the centerpiece of Tsebelis' analysis. Specifically, we find that the calculation of one player's equilibrium mixed strategy depends only on the opponent's payoffs and vice versa, which suggests that if we wish to influence a person's mixed strategy, we should change the opponent's, rather than that person's, payoffs. If we are accustomed to thinking in decisiontheoretic terms, this argument seems a strange disjuncture in reasoning. This disjuncture, though, is more apparent than real. First, the possibility of expressing a solution without reference to one's own payoffs arises only in two-person games. For games with n > 2 players, an equation stating the mixed equilibrium solution for one player must be formulated in terms of the remaining n -1 players' strategies (thereby formalizing the gametheoretic reasoning that conditional on beliefs, each player chooses a strategy that is a best response to the strategies of everyone else); and, except for special cases, no equation can be solved without simultaneously solving for the strategies of all other players. In such simultaneous equation systems, all strategies are functions of each other. Thus, each strategy is a function of every player's payoffs. Only for two-player games are we guaranteed that the algebra of solutions reduces to the simple form upon which Tsebelis bases much of his analysis. Perhaps it is for this reason that game theorists find the algebra of two-person games to be little more than a curiosity rather than a basis on which to formulate public policy.
Second, the disjuncture identified by the algebra of two-person games is misleading even for that case because the connection with one's own payoffs is made through the concept of an equilibrium and the rationalizations for this concept's relevance. Thus, a particular strategy, identified by some algebraic identity, has behavioral meaning only because it is part of an equilibrium strategy pair and because the concept of an equilibrium is hypothesized to have meaning-and equilibrium pairs are a function of both persons' payoffs. Hence, it is only when we pursue the shorthand calculation of mixed strategy equilibria and disregard the rationale of our calculations that an apparent disjuncture appears. Put simply, game theory is more than a set of algebraic relationships, and only when we take that theory as a whole can we give substantive interpretation to any piece of algebra. To suppose otherwise is to abuse that theory. With respect, now, to technical errors, the first arises with respect to Theorem 6, which asserts, "If a two-player game has no pure strategy equilibria, it has a unique mixed strategy equilibrium." Aside from the fact that the essay, at this point, deals with (n + 1) X (n + 1) games, preconditions are unstated. However, the game's size is irrelevant, since we can expand a game without altering its strategic character by adding strategies that are strictly dominated by a preexisting strategy. Counterexamples to the asserted result, then, include the zero-sum game of Table  2 . Row chooser has a mixed equilibrium strategy that gives positive probability only to a, and a2, an equilibrium strategy that gives positive probability only to a3 and a4, a class of equilibrium strategies that gives positive weight to any three pure strategies, and another class that gives positive weight to all four of row chooser's pure strategies. Moreover, although column chooser has a unique mixed equilibrium strategy, (1/2,1/2), we can increase the number of equilibria for this player merely by reproducing columns bi and b2 under the labels b3 and b4.
Tsebelis (p. 88) also asserts that games can be neatly subdivided into three classes: "(1) dominance solvable games and those with unique pure strategy equilibria, (2) games with multiple pure strategy equilibria, and (3) games without pure strategy equilibria (that have one, mixed strategy equilibrium)." However, in the following game, column chooser has an infinity of mixed equilibrium strategies (1/2 S q* s 4/5, where q* is the equilibrium probability that column chooser selects bi); whereas row chooser selects a3 with certainty, so an equilibrium can be a mixture of pure and mixed strategies, as in Table 3 .
So that we should not suppose that counterexamples are limited to zero-sum games, consider the four-by-four nonzero sum game in Table 4 Problems also arise with respect to Theorem 7, which reads, "In a two-player game with no pure strategy equilibria, modification of the payoffs of one player will lead that player either to change the pure strategies that he or she mixed or to leave the mixed equilibrium strategy of the opponent." The clause ". . . will lead . . . he or she mixed" is confusing; but a reasonable restatement is, ". . . will lead that player to change the set of pure strategies receiving nonzero probability from his or her mixed equilibrium strategy." This restatement presumes that we should first make certain that we do not change a player's payoffs in such a way as to render one or more strategies dominated, since then the successive elimination of dominated strategies can reveal a radical change in the game's strategic character. And although I do not otherwise quarrel with the assertion that one player's strategy will be unchanged by changes in the opponent's payoffs, the assertion that the opponent's strategy necessarily changes is false. For example, the theorem is false if we allow payoff changes in cells that occur with zero probability in equilibrium. And even if we suppose that mixed strategies span each player's strategy set, we must qualify matters by supposing that the theorem presupposes something other than linear monotonic changes, since solutions are invariant with such transformations (otherwise the rationalization for expected util- Table 5 , where the numbers in the cells correspond to column chooser's payoffs. We cannot keep k constant, of course, if we change only one variable; but the fact remains that a valid result requires additional constraints on allowed payoff changes. However, at this point formulating and rigorously proving a correct theorem seems more effort than it is worth; and limiting discussion to twoperson games not only precludes general relevance but also can yield misleading inferences. In any event, once we acknowledge the importance of accommodating interdependent choices into our analyses, we can refer to the considerable literature that treats the mathematical properties of solutions to games. But regardless of auxiliary assumptions, the Folk Theorem leads us to expect an infinity of equilibria (Fudenberg and Maskin 1986). For example, if no crime and no enforcement is an equilibrium in the iterated game, so are all the outcomes where the public violates the law and the police enforce the law with any frequency smaller than the equilibrium frequencies in the one-shot game (p * and q *). The Folk Theorem is a possibility theorem. It says that practically any outcome is possible. As a result, it is a very poor guide for prediction when used alone.
577
This is why game theorists have offered additional refinements of the concept of (perfect) equilibria in iterated games. One such refinement is the concept of stationary equilibrium, which leads to the same behavior in each iteration of the game.12 As a result, stationary equilibria are the natural focal points when new players participate in the game. But in the police. public game, the equilibrium strategy pair in the single-shot game is the unique stationary equilibrium in the iterated game.
Ordeshook's technical points dispute item 2, that the analysis of the two-bytwo game can be generalized for any finite number of strategies of the two players. I agree with Ordeshook's numerical examples and with their conclusions but question their relevance to his main point.
Let me start with an example. Consider the statement that a change in distance or time yields a change in velocity, velocity being distance divided by time. This statement is technically false because one can double both distance and time, thereby changing both, without changing velocity. However, the statement is true the rest of the time (that is, almost always), and any argument including it needs very little substantive modification to prevent falsification along these lines. Ordeshook's last example is exactly of this kind (it holds only because of the specific numerical values he uses); and the rest of his numerical examples share similar features, that is, technically they falsify some of my statements but leave them largely intact substantively, Ordeshook is correct that a game without pure strategy equilibrium has, in general, multiple mixed strategy equilibria (see Harsanyi 1973b ). However, all these mixed strategy equilibria, contrary to Ordeshook's assertion that they "have different properties," share a common property that lies at the heart of my argument; namely, each player's equilibrium strategies depend on its opponent's payoffs. As a result, a change in one player's payoffs will in general either destroy the mixed strategy equilibrium or lead the opponent to modify its strategy (as I demonstrated in my article). It is also possible on occasion that changes in the payoffs may be of a special numerical value such that even the opponent will not have to modify its strategy (changes in the payoffs of strategies mixed with probability zero or linear transformation of all payoffs of one player, to use Ordeshook's examples). However, Ordeshook's examples rely on particular numerical modifications and do not affect the general validity of my argument.
Concerning the partition of two-person games, Ordeshook presents an interesting example with an infinity of mixed strategy equilibria. This example is, again, exceptional. In game-theoretic terms, the equilibria Ordeshook presents are irregular. 13 However, it can be shown that in "almost all normal form games all equilibria are regular (hence, quasi-strict, strongly stable, essential, isolated, strictly proper, proper and perfect)" (Damme 1987, 41) . 4 Damme explains why irregular equilibria are exceptional: "The existence of an irregular equilibrium entails a special numerical relationship among the payoffs of the game, and this relationship can be disturbed by perturbing the payoffs of the game slightly."1'5 Consequently, my classification holds for "almost all" normal form games. "Almost all" normal form games can be partitioned into games with (1) multiple pure strategy equilibria, (2) one pure strategy equilibrium, or (3) no pure strategy equilibrium (which, as Ordeshook points out, will have one or more mixed strategy equilibria).
Thus, Ordeshook's technical points are correct. However, because of their exceptional character, they do not modify the substance of item 2, that the Robinson Crusoe fallacy is not an artifact of a two. by-two game. His major point, however, is that because my results are derived from two-person games they are "little 578 more than a curiosity rather than a basis on which to formulate public policy." If correct, this assertion would be fatal for my argument. 16 How The police-public game is part of a more complex game where a third player, the legislature, makes the rules. I will introduce the legislature into my model as an explicit third player and show that contrary to Ordeshook's expectations, both its logic and conclusions remain intact.
The role of the legislature is to vote on different laws regulating penalties for illegal activities (and possibly the rewards of legal activities) and to create an incentive system for the police to enforce the law. In game-theoretic terms, the legislature ex ante decides the payoffs of the police and the public. Figure 2 represents a game of incomplete information modeling the situation I have just described. A fictitious player ("nature") selects whether a particular member of the public will be naive (with probability Pgi) or sophisticated (with probability I 1 Pgl). Similarly, nature chooses whether a particular police agent will be naive (with probability Pg2) or sophisticated (with probability 1 -Pg2). Each player then chooses one of two strategies.19 The payoff for each player associated with each outcome is found at the final nodes of the game tree, and the order of these payoffs is presented in the margin of (3) and (4) leads to the conclusion that in this (more complicated and more realistic) game, too, modification of the payoffs of one player leads the opponent to modify strategy (in general). This is a general property: as long as the number of police agents and members of the public is finite, the equilibrium strategy pairs will exhibit this property.21
Comparison of equations (3) and (4) with the equilibrium strategy pair of the simple two-by-two game in my article (see Bianco's equations 1-2) leads to the conclusion that the two games have exactly the same equilibria. In other words, as long as sophisticated players use mixed strategies, the frequency of crime and of law enforcement that the two models predict is exactly the same!22 Although this identity of equilibria is not a general property, it generates some interesting insights.
The Congestion Effect
The reason that the equilibria of the two models (that with incomplete information and that presented in the initial article) are identical follows. Since by assumption the naive players have a dominant strategy, they will select this strategy regardless of other considerations. The sophisticated types, however, calculate their optimal strategy as a function of the optimal (equilibrium) strategy of their opponent, as well as the frequency of their own and their opponent's types. So, at equilibrium, the frequency of violation of the law is a function not only of the payoffs of the opponent but also of the frequencies of the different types of players. Simple observation of equations (3) and (4) suggests that the more lawabiding citizens there are, the more the non-law-abiding feel free to violate the law. Similarly, the more reliable police agents there are, the more the other police agents will free ride. 2. See especially his discussion of how the players will respond in the short run and the long run to changes in their payoffs (Tsebelis 1989, 82) .
3. According to Friedman (1986, 103) , the Folk Theorem is due to Robert Aumann. Aumann (1981) suggested that since the late 1960s, game theorists have believed that any individually rational outcome could be supported as an equilibrium, given no discounting of future payoffs. Aumann labeled this result as the Folk Theorem because its source was not known. Subsequent work (summarized in Fudenberg and Maskin 1986) has proved the result and generalized it to iterated games with discounting.
4. For a discussion of whether this claim is generally true for bimatrix games with no pure strategy equilibria, see Ordeshook's contribution to this controversy.
5. Games of infinite iterations with discounting are mathematically identical but analytically more tractable than games where players interact for an indefinite number of iterations. It is the latter case that corresponds to real-world interactions between police and public. only equilibria of a game are in mixed strategies, they will (in general) exhibit all the desirable properties of stability. For example, since they are regular, they can be shown to be the limit equilibria in games with incomplete information and perturbed payoffs (Harsanyi 1973a) . Similarly, they are likely to be evolutionary stable.
15. In more precise terms, from all games with pure strategy spaces S., . . , Sn, the set with an irregular equilibrium is closed with Lebesgue measure zero (see Harsanyi 1973b or Damme 1987, 42-43 for the proof). In plain English, the probability that a two-by-three game chosen at random will have an equilibrium like the one in Ordeshook's example is zero. 16. Ordeshook makes one additional point concerning the necessity to "take [game theory] as a whole" in order to "give substantive interpretation to any piece of algebra." I assume he means that equilibrium strategies have to be considered in pairs. I agree with him, but I cannot see what he finds objectionable in my treatment. I compare two games with the same payoffs except for the size of the penalty (a,) and observe that the difference between their equilibria is the frequency of police enforcement, not the frequency of crime. This is standard comparative statics analysis.
17. The public can choose to violate the law regardless of the choices of the legislature, can violate the first set of rules but respect the second, respect the first set of rules but violate the second, or always respect the law. Similarly, the police have the choice among four strategies.
18. See Selten 1975 and Myerson 1978. As a result, each of the initial two-person games is technically a subgame of the three-person game, and the subgame perfect equilibrium concept is applicable.
19. "Good" police agents always choose to monitor and "good" citizens always choose to abide by the law. 20. To derive these two equations one has to write down the expected utility of each player as a function of the payoffs and the probabilities p (that the sophisticated member of the public violates the law) and q (that the sophisticated police agent monitors) and set the first derivatives with respect to p (for the public) and q (for the police) to zero (Tsebelis, n.d.a).
21. For an infinite number of types of players, this proposition is not true. For the solution of a similar problem where the number of types is infinite and the different types follow a uniform distribution, see Tsebelis 1990a.
22. The reader can verify this statement by calculating the overall frequency of violation of the law as the product of the frequency of sophisticated members of the public and the frequency that this sophisticated public violates the law (equation 3). Similarly, the frequency of monitoring is equal to the proportion of naive police agents and the product of the proportion of sophisticated police and the frequency of monitoring (equation 4).
